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For some time now, scholars have come to recognize the existence 
of numerous structural infirmities deeply embedded within the mod-
ern copyright system.
1
  Most of these infirmities have been attributed 
to internal tensions within copyright law and policy, including the 
competing philosophies of access and control, use and exclusion, and 
rights and exceptions.  Professor Stadler’s insightful article documents 
these tensions and proposes a new way of mediating them.
2
  She ar-
gues that copyright law is best understood as instantiating a restriction 
on unfair competition and, consequently, that it should do little more 
than protect creators of original works from “competitive harm” in a 
previously identified (“relevant”) market.
3
  She goes on to propose 
that this principle be applied exogenously in determining the struc-
ture of copyright, and that the copyright grant be reformulated to 
consist of no more than an exclusive right to distribute works pub-
licly.
4
 
While I share Professor Stadler’s belief that copyright law ought to 
be visualized as a doctrine of unfair competition, my concern lies with 
her solution, which I believe does not commit copyright law suffi-
ciently to the goal she identifies for it.  This Response argues for an 
alternative conception of unfair competition within copyright doc-
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trine:  one that is premised on a restitutionary ideal and focuses on 
identifying unfair competition endogenously and contextually.  If un-
fair competition is really what copyright is all about, then its principles 
ought to influence copyright law at every stage and not just in its ex 
ante structuring, as Professor Stadler suggests.  Part I sets out the sali-
ent features of Professor Stadler’s proposal—characterized by its use 
of unfair competition to structure copyright’s exclusive rights frame-
work.  Part II contrasts this with a functional approach to unfair com-
petition within copyright law.  Part III then concludes by illustrating 
how the functional variant might work outside the confines of the re-
production right. 
I.  THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
Drawing an analogy to the “antitrust injury rule” that courts rou-
tinely apply in antitrust cases, Professor Stadler argues that copyright 
law ought to be similarly limited to an identifiable purpose, which she 
describes as protecting creators of original works from competitive 
harm in a relevant market.
5
  Interestingly though, she then parts com-
pany with antitrust law by concluding that the task of defining “rele-
vant markets in copyrighted works” is best left to Congress and “not 
the courts.”
6
  To Professor Stadler, the law should calibrate copyright’s 
grant of exclusive rights to the primary market in which the owner or-
dinarily commercializes the work—and no more.
7
  Consequently, for 
printed works—“works that c[an] be replicated without diminishing 
their market value among intended users making intended uses”
8
—
this entails limiting the grant to no more than an exclusive right to 
distribute the work publicly.
9
  Two prominent features characterize 
her model:  1) its reliance on Congress to identify the harms that 
copyright owners are entitled to be protected against; and 2) the de-
 
5
See id. at 933-34 (noting the similarity between the antitrust injury rule and the 
general law of unfair competition).  For more on the antitrust injury rule, see Roger D. 
Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1989).  
See also Diane P. Wood, “Unfair” Trade Injury:  A Competition-Based Approach, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1153, 1172-74 (1989) (advocating the extension of the antitrust injury rule into 
trade law more generally). 
6
Stadler, supra note 2, at 936 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7
See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
8
Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 634 
(2006). 
9
Stadler, supra note 2, at 937. 
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lineation of harm, market and the scope of the owner’s grant a priori 
through legislation. 
It is not readily apparent why Professor Stadler prefers Congress 
to the courts, given that in recent times some of the most far-reaching 
limits on property rights within the context of both antitrust and 
copyright law have come from the courts rather than Congress.
10
  It 
may well be that she has little faith in the judicial branch’s willingness 
to introduce radical changes; yet, her model does not altogether obvi-
ate the need for a shift in the way courts think of copyright and its 
goals.  Professor Stadler’s model still looks to courts to preempt at-
tempts to circumvent copyright’s statutory limits, to develop the doc-
trine of copyright misuse, and most importantly, to balance users’ 
privileges against owners’ exclusive (and exclusionary) rights;
11
 how-
ever, it does little to instantiate the goals of unfair competition into 
these myriad doctrines.  Unless judges, on their own initiative, were to 
give effect to the goals of copyright that Professor Stadler posits, it is 
likely that her model would produce problems similar to the ones she 
identifies in the current system, almost all of which are the products of 
judicial interpretation. 
Perhaps more importantly, Professor Stadler’s model assumes that 
competitive harm and relevant markets, once identified, will remain 
constant for a given category of works.  By eliminating altogether the 
reproduction right in relation to printed works, Professor Stadler’s 
approach disregards the possibility that a market for a work may exist 
outside of its actual public distribution.  For instance, a copyrighted 
work that is commercialized within the context of a business model 
(e.g., diagnostic software
12
) may be copied by a competitor in the 
 
10
In the context of copyright law, see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (finding the originality requirement to be mandatory before 
a work can be granted protection); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (propounding the substantial noninfringing use defense to 
secondary liability); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 
400-02 (1968) (disallowing copyright control over cable retransmissions).  The judicial 
innovation known as the “essential facilities doctrine” in the antitrust context is simi-
larly used to limit an owner’s right to exclude.  See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (ruling that an electric power company with a mo-
nopoly in an area had violated antitrust laws by refusing to deal with competitors that 
were dependent on it); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 
409 (1912) (finding entities that had combined to restrict all rail access to a river cross-
ing to be in violation of antitrust laws). 
11
Stadler, supra note 2, at 949-58. 
12
See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that the copying of software into RAM does constitute the creation of a copy 
under the Copyright Act, and that its use thereafter for business purposes is a copy-
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same field of operation, without actual public distribution.  Free-
riding of this nature is certainly a competitive harm, if the market 
were defined as one for services centered around the work. 
Professor Stadler’s structural model certainly solves the problems 
that she identifies in relation to unauthorized reproductions.  While 
Professor Stadler acknowledges that her model is restricted to the nar-
row case of reproduction and distribution rights,
13
 it is clear that 
analogous recalibration will be needed to eliminate the problems that 
exist with copyright’s other exclusive rights.  If unfair competition as a 
principle entails no more than statutorily withholding one or more of 
a creator’s rights under copyright law, or depending on a categoriza-
tion of creative works that is external to copyright, it suffers from an 
obvious lack of flexibility—one that stands in stark contrast to antitrust 
law, where contextual doctrinal development has proven to be very 
successful. 
II.  A FUNCTIONAL ALTERNATIVE 
It remains possible, however, to conceive of unfair competition in 
terms of what common law scholars identify as the principle of “unjust 
enrichment.”
14
  Deriving from the law of restitution, the principle of 
unjust enrichment simply provides that “[a] person who is unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the 
other.”
15
 
Standing by itself, the principle provides little direction, except to 
emphasize a norm of corrective justice.
16
  Yet, when applied to the 
context of one competitor’s use of an intangible created by another, it 
gives rise to a workable ideal, which courts and scholars occasionally 
refer to as the doctrine of misappropriation or the prohibition on 
“reap[ing] where [one] has not sown.”
17
 
 
right infringement).  Leaving aside the issue of ephemeral copying, the plaintiff’s 
business model relied heavily on its diagnostic software.  See id. at 514-15. 
13
See Stadler, supra note 2, at 909 (leaving aside the rights of adaptation, display, 
and performance). 
14
See generally PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (2003). 
15
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (Discussion 
Draft 2000); see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). 
16
See Jules L. Coleman, Intellectual Property and Corrective Justice, 78 VA. L. REV. 283, 
284 (1992) (explaining that the principle of unjust enrichment only delineates the 
duty to relinquish wrongfully secured gains, not to whom those gains should ultimately 
be ascribed). 
17
Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown:  Unjust Enrichment in the 
Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 595, 612 (1942) (internal quotation marks 
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While the Supreme Court is credited with being the first to link 
unfair competition to the principle of unjust enrichment in its infa-
mous decision in International News Service v. Associated Press,
18
 the 
model has since been developed rather extensively by scholars.  How-
ever, most of this has happened in the context of common law intel-
lectual property and almost never within the confines of traditional 
copyright, where it is likely to be equally (if not more) effective.
19
 
In a somewhat different context, Professor Wendy Gordon advo-
cates the idea that liability for copying be premised on the existence 
of a “competitive nexus” between the plaintiff and the defendant, with 
the burden being placed on the plaintiff to establish that it is or shortly 
will be serving the market in which the defendant is operating.
20
  Using 
this nexus, she argues, satisfies unjust enrichment’s requirement of 
detriment—i.e., that the defendant’s profit be at the expense of the 
plaintiff.
21
 
What might copyright law come to look like, if a similar nexus re-
quirement were introduced to limit liability?  Since copyright is about 
generating incentives for creation, we might want to connect this 
nexus requirement to copyright’s instrumental purpose through a test 
of foreseeability.
22
  Given that liability for infringement is premised on 
a showing of copying, such a test would place the burden on the plain-
 
omitted).  But see Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation:  A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 
621 (2003) (arguing that misappropriation should be abandoned as a unifying princi-
ple of intellectual property law). 
18
248 U.S. 215, 240-42 (1918) (regarding news gathered by the plaintiff as prop-
erty, unwillingly abandoned, and misappropriated by a competing news service). 
19
See, e.g., Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intel-
lectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875, 906 (1991) (arguing that the common law 
doctrine of misappropriation be given analytical content by limiting it to “competitive 
markets”). 
20
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:  Intellectual Property and the Restitution-
ary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 221-22, 238-48 (1992). 
21
Id. at 239 & n.338. 
22
I bracket, for the moment, the question of why a test of foreseeability is indeed a 
meaningful basis on which to allocate the option value associated with a protected 
work.  In brief, my reason derives from copyright law’s theory of incentives and the 
idea of bounded rationality.  As an instantiation of the principle of bounded rational-
ity, foreseeability postulates that events and occurrences of low probability are incapa-
ble of providing individuals with incentives to act.  See Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause 
and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 388-89 (1984) (understanding reason-
able foresight as “an amount of information that would imply both a recognition and 
an estimation of expected harm”).  If copyright is indeed about providing authors with 
an incentive to generate creative expression, then uses of a work (i.e., copying) that 
were unforeseeable to the creator when the work was created are unlikely to have 
formed any part of copyright’s ex ante incentive and should therefore fall outside the 
creator’s entitlement of exclusivity. 
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tiff to show that the defendant’s copying was in a market and of a 
form reasonably foreseeable when the work was created.  This “foreseeable 
copying” test, even though based on the plaintiff’s intent, would re-
main an objective determination temporally limited to the point of 
creation of the work.  In market terms, it would thus ask, “Is the de-
fendant’s allegedly infringing use occurring in a market that the crea-
tor could have reasonably foreseen when he created the work?”
23
  This 
inquiry would ensure that a copyright owner is not able to define the 
market for the work ex post.  Neither would an owner be able to in-
fluence a court’s determination by hastily developing a new market.
24
  
All the same, relegating this determination to courts (and not Con-
gress) allows creators to innovatively develop business models around 
their works. 
If a competitive nexus requirement were introduced as a principle 
of standing, operating in the same way as the antitrust injury rule 
does, it would serve to solve all of the problems that Professor Stadler 
identifies with the current regime.
25
  It would eliminate liability for 
private, noncommercial copying altogether since it would not entail 
any actual competition between the parties.  It would also have the re-
sult of decreasing defendants’ reliance on the fair use doctrine by 
shifting the burden to plaintiffs to establish the existence of a com-
petitive nexus as a condition precedent to sustaining the cause.  Addi-
tionally, it would solve much of the derivative works problems, where 
substitutability is widely interpreted. 
The foreseeability requirement is also likely to be of significant 
indirect value from a utilitarian perspective.  With copyright liability 
now made contingent on the existence of a commercial market (and 
unfair competition therein), a creator has little incentive to create 
without simultaneously developing a market for the creative work.  By 
disincentivizing private creation devoid of public commercialization, 
 
23
Professor Gordon rejects using a subjective foreseeability test both within and 
outside the copyright context.  See Gordon, supra note 20, at 238 & n.337; Wendy J. 
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:  The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1385 (1989) (“[A] rule of law that denied 
authors compensation except to their ‘expected’ markets could cause line-drawing 
problems that would dampen the incentives that new markets should bring.”). 
24
See Stadler, supra note 2, at 905-06 (commenting on such an occurrence in re-
sponse to the Google Library Project). 
25
See id. at 942-58 (detailing the problems of personal copying, of copyright hold-
ers making an “end run” around the copyright laws to increase protection, and of the 
minor role that the fair use doctrine has played in copyright analysis). 
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the requirement is more likely to encourage public, commercial dis-
tribution.
26
 
Central to moving copyright toward a model of unfair competi-
tion is the belief that the mere act of copying, devoid of competitive 
harm, should not be forbidden—a belief that I share with Professor 
Stadler.
27
  Implicit in this belief is the assumption that when copying is 
accompanied by commercial harm, either directly (when the work is 
commercialized without distribution) or indirectly (through distribu-
tion), it should be restricted on corrective justice grounds.  Eliminat-
ing all restrictions on copying ignores this nuance.  A restitutionary 
approach to unfair competition, embedded within the actual doc-
trines of copyright law, achieves precisely this result, by allowing 
courts to contextualize competition and to move the doctrine along 
incrementally. 
III.  THE COMPETITIVE NEXUS IN ACTION:  BEYOND COPYING 
Adopting a functional, competitive nexus prerequisite to copy-
right infringement is likely to be beneficial across the entire spectrum 
of copyright’s exclusive rights.  Within the context of the reproduc-
tion right, on which Professor Stadler focuses, a foreseeability re-
quirement is likely to eliminate lawsuits in which the defendant copies 
a creative work in a market that the creator could not have foreseen at 
the time of creation.  Thus, if Google were to establish that the market 
in which it is attempting to operate with the Google Library Project is 
not one that potential competitors could have reasonably foreseen at 
the time they created their work, the Project’s legality under copyright 
law should not be questioned.  The requirement is, however, likely to 
prove equally useful in the context of copyright’s other rights—most 
notably the right to create derivatives and the public performance 
right. 
 
26
One might want to expand the direct commercialization requirement to allow 
for situations in which the creator licenses the work to another to commercialize it, as 
is generally the case with individual authors.  Commercialization should not be inter-
preted as analogous to the market for licensing, as doing so would result in a circular-
ity that courts frequently recognize.  See Stadler, supra note 2, at 903-04 & n.24 (citing, 
among other sources, 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 13.05[A][4], at 13-196 to -197 (2006)). 
27
Id. at 909, 927-28. 
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A.  The Derivate Works Right 
Of copyright’s other exclusive rights, the right to control the pro-
duction of derivative works
28
 suffers from several of the problems that 
the author identifies with the reproduction right.  For one, determin-
ing whether a work is a derivative, under the loosely-worded terms of 
the definition,
29
 often plays into the hands of rights-holders.
30
  Addi-
tionally, courts routinely apply the same test, whether in the context 
of a reproduction right claim or a derivative works claim.
31
  It is not 
surprising, then, that much along the lines of Professor Stadler’s pro-
posal for the reproduction right, others have argued for the abolition 
of the derivative works right.
32
 
The nexus requirement would work to limit the operation of the 
derivative works right.  It would restrict the copyright owner’s claim to 
those derivative works that were objectively foreseeable to the creator 
at the time of creation.  This would accord the owner control over 
standard derivatives (since they would presumably satisfy the objective 
test) such as abridgements, motion pictures, and translations, but 
would preclude owners from blocking derivative works that are genu-
inely novel or that innovatively employ previous work in an independ-
ent market. 
In Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., Judge Posner observed 
that “copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work . . . is fair 
use, but copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted work . . . is not 
fair use.”
33
  Professor Stadler rightly notes that this distinction is of lit-
tle utility unless the relevant (or target) market is first identified.
34
  A 
 
28
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000). 
29
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
30
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01, at 
3-3 to -5 (2007) (noting that the definition of a derivative work as being “‘based upon 
one or more pre-existing works’” implies that a derivative work “must incorporate that 
which itself is the subject of copyright”). 
31
See, e.g., Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int’l Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 117 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (finding no infringement when a secondary work transforms the primary 
work such that “the two works cease[] to be substantially similar”); Castle Rock Entm’t, 
Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-43 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding a copy-
right violation in part because the defendant’s work did not appreciably transform the 
plaintiff’s primary work). 
32
See Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math:  The Economics of Legalizing The Grey Al-
bum, 59 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=979833 (arguing that abolishing the derivative works right is likely to have 
significant economic benefits). 
33
292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). 
34
Stadler, supra note 2, at 935-36. 
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competitive nexus requirement would achieve precisely this, and 
move the emphasis from fair use to the scope of the exclusive right.  
The defendant would no longer have to establish that his work is 
complementary or transformative; rather, the plaintiff would have to 
show that the defendant’s work is situated in a market that she could 
reasonably have expected to enter when she created the work. 
B.  The Performance Right 
Two landmark Supreme Court cases, both implicating the public 
performance right and decided under pre-1976 copyright law in the 
formative era of the domestic television industry, evince concerns 
nearly identical to those that the competitive nexus rule helps to alle-
viate.  It is worth considering how these cases might have been on 
stronger doctrinal footing had the requirement actually been in 
place.
35
 
Both cases involved a rather simple question:  whether a cable op-
erator’s capturing of copyrighted content from publicly available, 
over-the-air broadcasts, and its commercial retransmission of the same 
to its customers, amounted to an infringement.  The Supreme Court 
answered the question in the negative not once, but twice.  In Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., the Court concluded that 
since cable companies received content broadcast freely over the air, 
much like ordinary home viewers, and then relayed it through “pri-
vate channels,” they were not “performing” the work in any sense of 
the term, but merely facilitating viewers’ access to already available 
content.
36
  In his dissent, Justice Fortas, perhaps rightly, accused the 
majority of providing the cable industry with a subsidy to “foster [its] 
development.”
37
  A few years later, in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision.
38
  It 
emphasized that cable operators were relaying to viewers “signals that 
could not normally be received” without them.
39
 
 
35
For a detailed analysis of these decisions and their impact on the regulatory re-
gime, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Social Costs of Property Rights in Broadcast (and 
Cable) Signals, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1303 (2007). 
36
392 U.S. 390, 398-401 (1968). 
37
Id. at 404-05 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
38
415 U.S. 394, 401-02, 415 (1974) (affirming the Second Circuit’s application of 
the Fortnightly Corp. rule). 
39
Id. at 408. 
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The doctrinal basis of the Court’s reasoning in both cases remains 
unquestionably shaky.
40
  The Court’s concern was that the cable op-
erators’ profits were not causing the copyright owner/broadcaster any 
competitive loss, but it lacked a doctrinal hook on which to center its 
analysis of this connection.  A foreseeability requirement would have 
allowed the Court to reach the same conclusions, but on firmer doc-
trinal footing.  Unless the copyright owners in both cases could af-
firmatively establish that they could have objectively foreseen operat-
ing in the cable television market when the work was created (an 
uphill task, given that the market did not exist until after most of the 
works in question were created), their claims would fail.  The absence 
of a foreseeable competitive nexus between the cable operators and 
the copyright owners/broadcasters would leave the operators’ actions 
outside of the scope of infringement liability. 
CONCLUSION 
As should be apparent, I agree with much of Professor Stadler’s 
basic intuition that the norms of unfair competition ought to make 
their way into copyright law and refine the way in which courts and 
lawmakers think about the subject.  Where I part company with her, 
though, is merely in identifying the best way of implementing this 
ideal.  Professor Stadler makes an exceptionally strong case for the 
copyright/unfair competition interface and in the process unearths 
much of the irrationality that has kept the two disciplines apart.  For 
this reason alone, it should be valuable reading for anyone interested 
in the issue of copyright reform. 
To many, Professor Stadler’s proposal (and perhaps my alterna-
tive) will appear inexplicably radical, given the rhetoric of piracy and 
the expansionary momentum that permeate copyright debates.  All 
the same, if it even so much as causes judges and lawmakers to take 
notice of the similarities between copyright and unfair competition 
and of the beneficial synergies they are capable of producing, it will 
have gone a long way in making an enduring contribution to the sub-
ject. 
 
 
 
40
See, e.g., Gillis L. Heller, Comment, Regulatory Versus Property Rights Solutions for 
the Cable Television Problem, 69 CAL. L. REV. 527, 534-35 (1981) (arguing that advances in 
copyright law had not kept pace with the technological advances of cable television). 
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